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FREE EXERCISE AND COMER: ROBUST
ENTRENCHMENT OR SIMPLY MORE OF A MUDDLE?
Mark Strasser *
INTRODUCTION
Several states are barred by their own constitutions from spending public monies in support of sectarian institutions. The United
States Supreme Court has manifested great ambivalence about the
constitutionality of such limitations. Sometimes, the Court has impliedly endorsed them as a reasonable measure to assure that Establishment Clause guarantees are respected. At other times, the
Court has suggested that such limitations are constitutionally disfavored, although the Court has not yet held that such amendments are per se unconstitutional. The Court’s most recent decision addressing state constitutional spending limitations, Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 1 adds another layer
of complexity and confusion to an already muddled jurisprudence.
That decision, unless modified, could have surprising implications
that the Court is avowedly unwilling to endorse.
Part I of this article discusses both a former proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution, the Blaine Amendment (“Federal Blaine Amendment”), that bans the use of public monies to
support sectarian schools and several state constitutional amendments (“State Blaine Amendments”) that bar such expenditures.
Part I also explains some of the difficulties in showing that these
amendments were motivated by animus and why demonstrating
such animus might not be sufficient to establish that such laws
should be struck down as a violation of constitutional guarantees.
Part II discusses the Court’s inconsistent attitudes towards State
Blaine Amendments, detailing some of the ways in which Comer
makes a confusing jurisprudence even more confusing. Part II.A
discusses Everson v. Board of Education, 2 a seminal case that the
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. 582 U.S. __, __, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Comer Court misinterprets. Part II.B discusses the Court’s ambivalent attitudes toward State Blaine Amendments as reflected in
Mitchell v. Helms 3 and Locke v. Davey. 4 Part II.C discusses Comer
and its misleading interpretation and application of Everson. The
article concludes that the Court’s most recent foray into this area
is, at best, regrettable for a number of reasons and must be modified or overruled.
I. THE PASSAGE OF THE STATE BLAINE AMENDMENTS
Many states have constitutional amendments limiting or prohibiting spending state monies on sectarian schools. Although these
amendments differ in word 5 and effect, 6 they are nonetheless
sometimes grouped together and called State Blaine Amendments. 7 That designation is itself biased because of the taint associated with the proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution
sponsored by Senator James Blaine in 1884. However, that taint,
even if deserved, may not sufficiently establish the constitutional
invalidity of those state constitutional amendments.

3. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
4. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
5. See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 554
(2003) (discussing “a collection of state constitutional provisions known collectively and generically as ‘Blaine Amendments’”); Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 67 (2005) (“Some states’
provisions do not even have language similar to the original Blaine Amendment, but are
dubbed ‘Blaine Amendments’ because they prohibit public funding of religious schools.”);
Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 297
(2008) [hereinafter Green, Insignificance] (“Several of those provisions contain language
that bears a similarity to language that appeared in one of the many versions of
Mr. Blaine’s proposed amendment. But the majority do not.”).
6. See Luke A. Lantta, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to Turn After
Federal Challenges to Blaine Amendments Fail, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 226 (2004)
(“The generally accepted taxonomy set forth by Professor Frank R. Kemerer divides state
constitutions into three general categories with respect to Blaine amendments: restrictive,
permissive and uncertain.”).
7. See Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (discussing “a class of state constitutional
provisions that appear in over thirty-five state constitutions and are known collectively as
‘State Blaine Amendments’”); Erica Smith, Blaine Amendments and the Unconstitutionality
of Excluding Religious Options from School Choice Programs, 18 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 48,
53 (2017) (“Now, 37 states have Blaine Amendments in their state constitutions.”). But see
Green, Insignificance, supra note 5, at 297 (“[T]he legal connection between the
Blaine Amendment and a majority of the state no-funding provisions—I will resist referring
to them as ‘Baby Blaines’—is uncertain at best.” (emphasis added)).
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A. The State Blaine Amendments
James Blaine, an ambitious representative from Maine, who
later became a United States Senator and sought the Republican
nomination for the presidency, proposed an amendment to the Federal Constitution, the Federal Blaine Amendment, that barred
state funding of sectarian schools. 8 It read:
[N]o money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public
schools, or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect,
nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between
religious sects or denominations. 9

The Federal Blaine Amendment received more than the requisite number of votes in the House of Representatives. 10 However,
because it failed to receive the necessary votes in the Senate, it was
never sent to the states for ratification. 11
Commentators debate whether the Federal Blaine Amendment
was prompted by anti-Catholic animus. 12 Senator Blaine, himself,
8. Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers: Nevada’s “Little
Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV.
L.J. 551, 557 n.31 (2002) (“Blaine aspired to run for the presidency in 1876, [but] . . . failed
to secure the nomination.”). Blaine was later the Republican nominee for President in 1884.
Barclay Thomas Johnson, Credit Crisis to Education Emergency: The Constitutionality of
Model Student Voucher Programs Under the Indiana Constitution, 35 IND. L. REV. 173, 202
(2001).
9. 4 CONG. REC. 205 (1875).
10. See Meir Katz, The State of Blaine: A Closer Look at the Blaine Amendments and
Their Modern Application, 12 ENGAGE 111, 112 (2011) (“[T]he Blaine Amendment . . . sailed
through the House by a vote of 180-7. . . .”).
11. See id. (“[T]he Blaine Amendment . . . failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds
majority in the Senate.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds
of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . .
which . . . shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .”).
12. Compare Katz, supra note 10, at 111 (“The Blaine Amendments have a dark and
unfortunate history. As the Supreme Court has explained, they ‘arose at a time of pervasive
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general.’ They were both adopted on the
basis of anti-Catholic animus and enforced in a discriminatory fashion.”), and Frank S. Ravitch, Locke v. Davey and the Lose-Lose Scenario: What Davey Could Have Said, but Didn’t,
40 TULSA L. REV. 255, 264 (2004) [hereinafter Ravitch, Lose-Lose Scenario] (“There is no
doubt that the motivations of those who originally supported state Blaine amendments were
heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus.”), and Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School
Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
657, 659 (1998) (“In fact, the Blaine Amendment is a remnant of nineteenth-century religious bigotry promulgated by nativist political leaders who were alarmed by the growth of
immigrant populations and who had a particular disdain for Catholics.”), with Steven K.
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denied having any animus towards Catholics—his mother was
Catholic, and he sent his daughters to Catholic boarding school. 13
Further, perhaps because he had already failed to secure the Republican nomination for the presidency that year, 14 Senator Blaine
was one of twenty-seven senators absent when the vote on the Federal Blaine Amendment was taken. 15 But even if it were true that
Senator Blaine, himself, felt no personal animus toward Catholics,
that would not end the discussion—a separate question was
whether he was trying to capitalize on the anti-Catholic animus
felt by others. 16
After the defeat of the Federal Blaine Amendment, several
states amended their constitutions to prohibit state funding of sectarian schools. 17 Just as there is debate about whether the Federal
Blaine Amendment was motivated by anti-Catholic animus, there
is a similar debate about the motivations behind the adoptions of
the State Blaine Amendments. However, analysis of whether passage of the State Blaine Amendments was motivated by anti-Catholic animus is more complicated because these amendments were
adopted at different times and under different conditions. 18 Some
of the State Blaine Amendments were adopted prior to the attempt
to amend the Federal Constitution, 19 so it would be anachronistic

Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1717, 1742 (2006) (“[M]y own research and that by Professor Noah Feldman
indicates that history provides no definitive conclusions about the rationales behind the
Amendment and the no-funding principle.”).
13. Duncan, supra note 7, at 509.
14. See Bybee & Newton, supra note 8, at 557 n.31.
15. Id.; DeForrest, supra note 5, at 573 (“The yeas were 28 and the nays were 16, with
27 senators absent, including, ironically enough, James Blaine himself . . . .”).
16. Cf. Katz, supra note 10, at 116 (“The court stated that the author of Kentucky’s
Blaine Amendment himself had clean hands. Even if true, the virulently anti-Catholic social and political climate, largely ignored by the court, is relevant.”); Viteritti, supra note
12, at 659 (“[T]he Blaine Amendment is a remnant of nineteenth-century religious bigotry
promulgated by nativist political leaders who were alarmed by the growth of immigrant
populations and who had a particular disdain for Catholics.”).
17. See Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable of
Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 131 (2009) (“[W]ithin
a year of its defeat at the national level, fourteen states had passed some type of Blaine legislation.”).
18. Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L. & POL. 65, 110 (2002) (“According to one scholar, in 1876 there were state laws or constitutional amendments to this
effect in fourteen states. By contrast, in 1890, fourteen years after the proposed Blaine
Amendment, fully twenty-nine states had adopted some sort of state constitutional amendment or statute guaranteeing no funding.”); cf. id. (“[T]here was probably some significant
variation from state to state.”).
19. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 200–01 (“Indiana’s 1851 Constitution was enacted
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to impute the animus associated with the Federal Blaine Amendment to those State Blaine Amendments that had already passed
through state legislatures. 20 That said, however, those state
amendments might nonetheless have been adopted because of
anti-Catholic animus, so the fact that the state amendments had
already been passed would not guarantee that they were not invidiously based. 21
Some of the State Blaine Amendments that were adopted after
the failed attempt to pass the Federal Blaine Amendment may well
have been motivated by animus, although others may well not
have been. 22 At the very least, these differing state histories suggest that a challenge to a particular state amendment based on the
claim that it was invidiously motivated would require an assessment of the motivations behind the adoption of that particular
amendment—it simply will not do to assume that because an
amendment in one state was adopted out of an invidious motivation, an amendment in a different state must also have been
adopted out of animus. 23 Further, even if it could be established
that a particular state constitutional amendment had been

nearly a quarter-century before then Governor Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio and Representative James G. Blaine began to publicly oppose the use of state funds to support Catholic
schools in 1875.”).
20. See Goldenziel, supra note 5, at 66 (“Many of these so-called ‘Blaine Amendments’
and related provisions were enacted before the Federal Blaine Amendment debate began.”).
21. See Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not Shackle the Present: The Revival of
a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
413, 423 (2003) (“The defeat of the amendment in Congress by no means quieted anti-Catholic animus, which had produced several Blaine-like amendments in state legislatures even
before the amendment’s consideration, and continued to do so in the decades that followed.”).
22. See Katz, supra note 10, at 112 (“Blaine Amendments were not simply grounded
in anti-Catholic animus.”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917,
969 (2003) (“Even if the case for anti-Catholic animus as a motivating force is supported by
substantial historical evidence in some states, the case may not be nearly so easy to make
in others.”); Ravitch, Lose-Lose Scenario, supra note 12, at 264 (“There is no doubt that the
motivations of those who originally supported state Blaine amendments were heavily influenced by anti-Catholic animus.”); see also Green, Insignificance, supra note 5, at 330 (“As
with the national proposal, state legislators may have been motivated by concerns about
ensuring the stability of still nascent public schools, preserving the integrity of public school
funds, avoiding religious competition, and adhering to a principle of nonestablishment.”);
Lantta, supra note 6, at 225 (“[E]vidence of anti-Catholic animus behind the federal Blaine
amendment cannot necessarily be imputed to the states, for even those enacted immediately
following Blaine’s amendment lack the same animus.”).
23. See Smith, supra note 7, at 53 (“[A]n individual assessment would be required before drawing conclusions about any particular Blaine Amendment . . . .”).
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adopted out of anti-Catholic animus, a separate question would be
whether that illegitimate pedigree would render such an amendment unconstitutional.
B. Animus and Constitutionality
Suppose that animus clearly motivated a legislature to pass
anti-religious legislation. If challenged soon after it became law,
such a statute would almost certainly be struck down. The Court
has made clear that a new law passed out of anti-religious animus
would have to survive strict scrutiny to pass constitutional muster. 24 Further, the mere passage of time does not immunize an unconstitutional statute from review and invalidation. 25 Nonetheless,
the Court has also suggested that statutes that may have previously failed to pass constitutional muster may now be upheld if the
purposes behind them have changed. 26
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court
rejected that the history behind the adoption of a particular practice was irrelevant to the analysis of whether that practice violated
Establishment Clause guarantees. 27 At issue were the postings of
the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky courthouses, although a
complicating factor in the analysis was the constitutionality of a
third display that had been mounted at a different time. 28
In attempting to discern the purpose behind the third display,
the Court found that consideration of the purpose behind mounting
the first two displays was relevant to its inquiry. 29 Yet, the Court
was not suggesting that a state practice, once tainted because of

24. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993).
25. Smith, supra note 7, at 53 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the passage
of time is insufficient to cleanse a law of its tainted history.”).
26. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 873–74 (2005).
27. Id. at 863–64 (“The Counties would . . . cut context out of the enquiry, to the point
of ignoring history, no matter what bearing it actually had on the significance of current
circumstances. There is no precedent for the Counties’ arguments, or reason supporting
them.”).
28. Id. at 850–55.
29. See id. at 872 (“No reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties
had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays.”).
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an unconstitutional purpose, would forever preclude such a practice from being adopted—the Court denied “that the Counties’ past
actions forever taint any effort on their part.” 30
How could a particular display, once deemed unconstitutional,
be deemed constitutional at a later time? That would depend upon
why the display was deemed unconstitutional. If it was initially
struck down because its purpose had been to promote religion, 31
then such a display might be upheld at a different time or place if
there was no indication that the latter had been mounted for a religious purpose. 32 Because one state might mount a particular display for a religious purpose, while a different state might mount
an identical display for a non-religious purpose, the former display
might violate constitutional guarantees even if the latter did not. 33
Similarly, the purposes behind a state’s action might change over
time—a state actor at one time might mount a display for religious
reasons, but at a different time might mount that same display for
non-religious reasons. 34 That said, not much time had elapsed between the displays at issue in McCreary County. 35 Further, some
aspects of the last display made it seem even more sectarian than
the first two displays. 36 The McCreary County Court had no difficulty in affirming that the third display had been mounted for a
religious purpose. 37
30. Id. at 873–74. Not all commentators read McCreary County this way. See Douglas
W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law & Roberts’s Revolution of Restraint, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 495, 500 (2007) (“It also appears that if the government changes its position
out of concern that its initial purpose or motivation was too religious, the government may
be confessing unconstitutionality, from which there can be no judicial redemption.”).
31. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (“[T]he First Amendment requires
that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.”).
32. Cf. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874 (“Nor do we have occasion here to hold that a
sacred text can never be integrated constitutionally into a governmental display on the subject of law, or American history.”).
33. See Kmiec, supra note 30, at 501 (“[O]ne consequence of its inquiry into the purpose
of ‘past actions was that the same government action may be constitutional if taken in the
first instance and unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage,’ suggesting that Kentucky’s
third display may have been constitutional had it been erected first.” (quoting McCreary
County, 545 U.S. at 866 n.14)).
34. See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890 n.3 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)
(“Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.”).
35. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 855 (“They then installed another display in each
courthouse, the third within a year.” (quoting McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 n.14)).
36. See id. at 872 (“[T]he sectarian spirit of the common resolution found enhanced expression in the third display, which quoted more of the purely religious language of the
Commandments than the first two displays had done . . . .”).
37. Id. at 872, 881 (discussing “the ample support for the District Court’s finding of a
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Suppose that the facts of McCreary County are changed. This
time, the first display, while not per se unconstitutional, is nonetheless held to violate constitutional guarantees because it is displayed for religious purposes. After much time has passed, new
town officials mount a new, second display with the same content,
offering non-religious reasons that are both plausible and sincerely
made. Merely because the previous display mounted for a religious
purpose had violated constitutional guarantees 38 it would not establish that the second display mounted for a non-religious purpose would also be unconstitutional. Arguably, the modified
McCreary County scenario involves two different displays that
happen to have the same content; the displays might even have
been created by different people. At least one issue is whether the
fact that there were two different displays would have constitutional significance—the Court might hold that the first religiously
motivated display was and continues to be unconstitutional,
whereas the second non-religiously motivated display is and always has been constitutionally permissible.
Contrast the scenario involving two different displays with a scenario involving one continuing display, where the purpose behind
the original exhibition was to promote religion, but the purpose behind continuing to exhibit the display is non-religious. The implicated constitutional issue is whether the impermissible purpose
behind the display’s creation would infect the display for constitutional purposes, so that its continued exhibition, even if for a permissible purpose, would nonetheless fail to pass constitutional
muster.
Certainly, it would be important to establish whether the true
purpose behind continuing to exhibit the display in question was
permissible. If the purpose behind continuing the display was no
different from the impermissible purpose behind the display’s creation, then the continued exhibition would also be constitutionally
impermissible. But that same analysis would apply even if there
were two different displays—if the purpose behind each display
was impermissible, then each would be prohibited. The problem
posed here is whether a previously impermissible purpose would
continue to render a display unconstitutional, even if the purpose

predominantly religious purpose behind the Counties’ third display”).
38. Cf. id. at 870 (“[T]he display and resolution presented an indisputable, and undisputed, showing of an impermissible purpose.”).

STRASSER AC 524 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

FREE EXERCISE AND COMER

4/6/2018 9:56 AM

895

behind the continued exhibition of the display did not offend constitutional guarantees. If the answer is “no,” then the fact that a
state constitutional amendment, which might at one time have
been held unconstitutional because of an impermissible purpose,
might survive a constitutional challenge now if it served legitimate
purposes. When the McCreary County Court rejected that a previously impermissible purpose would forever taint a state actor’s actions, 39 it at least suggested that a display that once would have
been held unconstitutional because of impermissible purpose may
no longer be unconstitutional if the purpose behind it had changed.
Else, the promise that there would be no permanent taint would
be false.
Consider Van Orden v. Perry, which involved the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol
grounds. 40 The plurality and concurring opinions suggested that
the purpose behind placing and retaining the monument on capitol
grounds was not religious, 41 whereas the dissenting opinions suggested that the monument had been placed and retained on capitol
grounds for a religious purpose. 42 Suppose, instead, that the plurality and concurring opinions had suggested that the monument,
although initially erected for a religious purpose, was now being
maintained for non-religious purposes and was constitutional.
Such an analysis would demonstrate that a monument or display,
initially unconstitutional because of the purpose behind it, might
later pass constitutional muster if the impermissible purpose was
no longer present. 43

39. See id. at 873–74.
40. 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion) (discussing “the display of a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds”).
41. Id. at 682–83 (“The District Court also determined that a reasonable observer,
mindful of the history, purpose, and context, would not conclude that this passive monument
conveyed the message that the State was seeking to endorse religion. The Court of Appeals
affirmed . . . with respect to the monument’s purpose . . . . We . . . now affirm.”); see also id.
at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The circumstances surrounding the display’s placement on
the capitol grounds and its physical setting suggest that the State itself intended the latter,
nonreligious aspects of the tablets’ message to predominate.”).
42. See id. at 722 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“God, as the author of its message, the Eagles, as the donor of the monument, and the State of Texas, as its proud owner, speak with
one voice for a common purpose—to encourage Texans to abide by the divine code of a
‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”); see also id. at 738 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Ten Commandments constitute a religious statement, that their message is inherently religious, and that
the purpose of singling them out in a display is clearly the same.”).
43. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600–09 (1961) (explaining that Sunday
Closing Laws, which historically had an unconstitutional, religious purpose, now have a
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In Braunfeld v. Brown, the Court implied that a law that once
would have been held unconstitutional because of an impermissible purpose might nonetheless pass muster if the purpose behind
it had changed. 44 At issue was a challenge to a Pennsylvania law
precluding the sale of certain items on Sundays. 45 The appellants
were Orthodox Jews, who had to close their businesses from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday for religious reasons. 46
Being prohibited from opening their stores on Sundays put them
at an economic disadvantage, because they essentially had to close
their stores from Friday evening to Monday morning. 47
The Braunfeld Court explained that although the Sunday Closing Law had been adopted for religious reasons, they had been retained for non-religious reasons. 48 Because there were legitimate,
non-religious reasons to have such laws in place, their having initially been adopted to support religion did not render them constitutionally offensive. 49
constitutional, secular purpose). It might be argued that the Ten Commandments are inherently religious and cannot be exhibited by a state under any circumstances. But the
Court has not adopted that view. Indeed, Justice Stevens did not suggest such a view in his
Van Orden dissent but, instead, that there should be a strong presumption against displaying religious symbols on public property. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]t the very least, the Establishment Clause has
created a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on public property.”)).
44. 366 U.S. at 600–09.
45. Id. at 600 (“This case concerns the constitutional validity of the application to appellants of the Pennsylvania criminal statute, enacted in 1959, which proscribes the Sunday
retail sale of certain enumerated commodities.”).
46. Id. at 601.
47. See id. at 601–02.
48. Id. at 602 (discussing “the evolution of Sunday Closing Law from wholly religious
sanctions to legislation concerned with the establishment of a day of community tranquillity”).
49. Id. at 602–03 (discussing Pennsylvania’s Sunday Closing Laws and finding a state
interest in creating a day of rest, despite their religious origin).
[W]e cannot find a State without power to provide a weekly respite from all
labor and, at the same time, to set one day of the week apart from the others
as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity—a day when the hectic
tempo of everyday existence ceases and a more pleasant atmosphere is created,
a day which all members of the family and community have the opportunity to
spend and enjoy together, a day on which people may visit friends and relatives
who are not available during working days, a day when the weekly laborer may
best regenerate himself.
Id. at 607. Even Braunfeld is not entirely clear on whether the same statute, formerly unconstitutional because of an improper purpose, might now be constitutionally permissible
because of a noninvidious purpose. Id. In McGowan v. Maryland, the Court considered equal
protection and establishment challenges to Sunday Closing Laws. 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961).
The McGowan Court wrote:
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A separate question was whether the law at issue in Braunfeld
had been retained for constitutionally adequate reasons. The majority of the states with Sunday Closing Laws at the time provided
an exception, specifying that, if a business was closed on a day
other than Sunday, that business would not also have to close on
Sunday. 50 Those states providing such an exception did not have
significant additional problems with noise or enforcement, 51 although Pennsylvania chose not to include such an exception in its
law. 52 If the federal constitutional protections for free exercise are
robust, then the articulated state interests in Braunfeld to justify
the Pennsylvania law, 53 although legitimate, were arguably insufficiently compelling to justify the burden imposed on free exercise. 54 If that is so, then the Pennsylvania Sunday Closing Law was
unconstitutional, although not because it initially had been
In light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the centuries,
and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular considerations, it is not
difficult to discern that as presently written and administered, most of them,
at least, are of a secular rather than of a religious character, and that presently
they bear no relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used
in the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 444. The McGowan Court was suggesting that the purpose behind the new Sunday
Closing Laws was not to promote religion, and the Braunfeld Court might have been considering the evolving Sunday Closing Laws rather than the original ones enacted for an
impermissible purpose. See id.; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602 (“We also took cognizance, in
McGowan, of the evolution of Sunday Closing Laws from wholly religious sanctions to legislation concerned with the establishment of a day of community tranquillity, respite and
recreation, a day when the atmosphere is one of calm and relaxation rather than one of
commercialism, as it is during the other six days of the week.”). The Braunfeld Court might
not have been thinking that the same law, formerly unconstitutional, was now constitutionally permissible, but that the former law was unconstitutional because it was religiously
motivated and the newer law was constitutional because it was not religiously motivated.
Nonetheless, the Court emphasized that the purposes behind (rather than the wording of)
the law had changed, at least implying that the same law, once unconstitutional, now passed
muster. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 602.
50. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[A] majority—21—of the 34 States which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this kind.”).
51. Id. at 614–15 (“We are not told that those States are significantly noisier, or that
their police are significantly more burdened, than Pennsylvania’s.”).
52. Id. at 600 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Pennsylvania criminal statute . . . proscribes
the Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities.”).
53. See id. at 608 (“[R]eason and experience teach that to permit the exemption might
well undermine the State’s goal of providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the
atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. Although not dispositive of the issue, enforcement problems would be more difficult since there would be two or more days to police rather
than one and it would be more difficult to observe whether violations were occurring.”).
54. See id. at 613–14 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“What,
then, is the compelling state interest which impels the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
impede appellants’ freedom of worship? . . . It is the mere convenience of having everyone
rest on the same day.”).
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adopted to promote religion. Perhaps Braunfeld should be overruled. 55 But the fact that it remains good law poses a difficulty for
those suggesting that the State Blaine Amendments should be
struck down on federal constitutional grounds.
Those challenging the constitutionality of State Blaine Amendments would likely have to establish that the adoption of the challenged amendment in particular had been motivated by anti-religious animus. 56 The lack of extensive, recorded legislative history
might severely hamper the efforts of those attempting to establish
the motivations behind the adoption of such a ban in a particular
state. 57 Even if one could establish that the initial motivation behind the adoption of a particular amendment was constitutionally
suspect, that alone would not suffice to establish the invalidity of
the amendment, as Braunfeld illustrates. If such an amendment
currently promotes legitimate state interests, 58 then the amendment’s unconstitutional origins might not suffice to establish the
amendment’s constitutional illegitimacy. 59
A complicating factor in any analysis of the constitutionality of
State Blaine Amendments is that the Court’s view on these matters seems to be shifting, and members of the Court sometimes offer surprising accounts of previous decisions to obscure the changes
that are occurring in the jurisprudence. 60 Decisions that previously
provided support for the constitutionality of such amendments are

55. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I think
the Braunfeld case was wrongly decided and should be overruled . . . .”).
56. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (noting that establishing that one
amendment had been adopted out of animus would not establish that a different one had
also been adopted out of animus); cf. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is no guilt by association, enabling the sovereignty of
one State to be abridged under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by
another State, or by most other States . . . .”).
57. See Goldenziel, supra note 5, at 62 (“Only scant historical records and incomplete
constitutional convention journals document the enactment of these amendments in the
states, and the few available accounts reveal little evidence of bigotry.”).
58. Frank S. Ravitch, The Supreme Court’s Rhetorical Hostility: What Is “Hostile” to
Religion Under the Establishment Clause?, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1031, 1045–46 (2004) (“The
motivations of state officials who currently support such ‘no aid’ amendments, and of parties
who sue to prevent government funding of religious entities, may have nothing to do with
enmity or hostility toward religion generally or a specific religion.”).
59. Cf. Goldenziel, supra note 5, at 62 (“Whatever anti-Catholic animus might have lain
behind the no-funding provisions at their inception has not yet been shown to influence
current state jurisprudence.”).
60. See infra notes 162–212 and accompanying text (discussing Comer’s possible reworking of the jurisprudence surrounding the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause).
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now implausibly characterized as supporting the opposite conclusion, 61 which may have important implications, not only for the
constitutionality of these state amendments in particular, but also
for the prevailing interpretation of the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause (collectively the “Religion Clauses”) more
generally.
II. STATE REFUSALS TO SUPPORT SECTARIAN SCHOOLS
AND THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has been sending mixed signals about the
constitutionality of state refusals to provide public funding to support religious institutions. At times, the Court has implied that
such a policy is, of course, permissible, although not constitutionally required. At other times, members of the Court have implied
that the refusal to use public funds to support religious institutions
is constitutionally disfavored, if not impermissible. The Court’s
most recent decision in this area, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 62 makes the jurisprudence even more confusing than it already was. 63
A. Everson’s Mixed Messages
Everson v. Board of Education64 is a seminal case in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 65 In that case, the Court suggested
that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was to erect a wall

61. See Goldenziel, supra note 5, at 58 (discussing how two years after holding that a
school voucher program “did not violate the federal establishment clause . . . two years later,
the Supreme Court implicitly approved the use of state constitutional amendments to provide stronger protection from religious establishment than that guaranteed by the federal
constitution”); see, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. __,
__, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
62. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2012.
63. See infra Part II.C.
64. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
65. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams’ Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 476 (1999) (describing “Everson v. Board of Education [as]
the seminal Establishment Clause case”); Wanda I. Otero-Ziegler, The Remains of the Wall:
From Everson v. Board of Education to Strout v. Albanese and Beyond, 10 TEMP. POL. &
C.R. L. REV. 207, 220 (2000) (“An analysis of the evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence must begin with the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education.”); Kirk A.
Kennedy, Note, Opportunity Declined: The Supreme Court Refuses to Jettison the Lemon
Test in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), 73 NEB. L. REV.
408, 412 (1994) (“The genesis of contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
the seminal case of Everson v. Board of Education.”).
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of separation between church and state that was to “be kept high
and impregnable.” 66 However, the wall described was more permeable than the Court’s words seemed to suggest 67 because the Court
upheld the permissibility of the state helping children to attend
parochial schools. 68
A little background is required to understand what the Everson
Court did and did not do. Ewing Township did not provide school
buses for all of its students. 69 Instead, some of the children used
public carriers to get to public school, 70 and the township reimbursed the parents for those transportation costs 71 based on the
school attendance sheets indicating the days that the children were
present. 72
The provision authorizing reimbursement was later amended. 73
In the words of the trial court, the amended authorization “includ[ed] the transportation of school children to and from school
other than a public school, except such school as is operated for
66. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The
Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (“In its first application of the establishment clause to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, the
Court . . . state[d] that the establishment clause was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation’
between church and state.”).
67. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17; Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil
Communion, and the Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 37 (1993) (“Everson itself,
allowing public funding of transportation expenses for students attending parochial
schools, amply demonstrated how permeable the ‘no aid’ barrier was in the welfare state.”).
68. William W. Bassett, Changing Perceptions of Private Religious Schools: Public
Money and Public Trust in the Education of Children, 2008 BYU L. REV. 243, 250 (2008)
(“In light of its hyperbolic rationale, the Court’s holding that the state could assist parents
in providing bus fares for their children to attend parochial schools was astounding.”);
Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
121, 127 (2001) (“The Everson decision did narrowly permit states to reimburse families for
bussing their children to parochial schools . . . .”); Donald L. Beschle, The Conservative as
Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O’Connor, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 153 (1987) (discussing Everson’s “holding that the first amendment permits reimbursement for the cost of bus transportation to religious schools”).
69. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 39 A.2d 75, 77 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944) (Heher, J., dissenting)
(“Here, the school district did not operate the transport.”), rev’d, 44 A.2d 333 (N.J.
1945), aff’d, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
70. Everson, 330 U.S. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“All school children are left to ride
as ordinary paying passengers on the regular busses operated by the public transportation
system.”).
71. Everson, 39 A.2d at 75 (discussing “the township paying . . . the costs of transportation advanced by parents or other relatives”).
72. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 44 A.2d 333, 335 (N.J. 1945) (“The payments to parents
were in satisfaction of advancements made by them; and the amount was fixed upon the
basis of the actual number of days’ attendance as indicated upon each pupil’s report card.”),
aff’d, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
73. Everson, 39 A.2d at 75 (citing 1903 N.J. Laws 45–46 and 1941 N.J. Laws 581).
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profit in whole or in part.” 74 That amendment permitted parents
who sent their children to parochial school to be reimbursed, and
the challenge at issue in Everson was the reimbursement of the
parochial school travel costs. 75
The Everson Court began its analysis by discussing the history
of religious discord that had been imported from Europe 76 to the
American colonies. 77 In the colonies, “dissenters were compelled to
pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches
whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to
strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a
burning hatred against dissenters.” 78 The Court then explained
that “[t]hese practices . . . shock[ed] the freedom-loving colonials
into a feeling of abhorrence.” 79 That feeling of abhorrence translated into legislative action on both federal and state levels. For
example, Virginia enacted religion-protecting legislation: “That no
man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall
otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief . . . .” 80 The Virginia statute provided the model for the First
Amendment protections found in the Federal Constitution. 81 In addition, many states followed Virginia’s example to “provide similar
constitutional protections for religious liberty.” 82
The Everson Court made clear that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth

74. Id. at 76 (citing 1941 N.J. Laws 581).
75. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3 (citing 1941 N.J. Laws 581) (“The appellant, in his capacity
as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a state court challenging the right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students.”).
76. See id. at 8–9 (“[A]t various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants,
Protestants had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant
sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics of another shade of belief,
and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews.”).
77. See id. at 9 (“These practices of the old world [treating religious minorities unfairly]
were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the new America.”).
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 11.
80. Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, ch. 34, 1786 Va. Acts 3, 26–27.
81. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (“[T]he provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting
and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on
religious liberty as the Virginia statute.”).
82. Id. at 13–14.
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Amendment to apply to the states, 83 and then it explained that the
Establishment Clause at the very least means the following: “No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” 84 The
Establishment Clause precluded “New Jersey [from] . . . contribut[ing] tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which
teaches the tenets and faith of any church.” 85 That said, the Court
also explained that the Free Exercise Clause precluded the State
from “exclud[ing] individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.” 86
The Court’s suggestion that states cannot deny public benefits
to individuals because of their faith requires interpretation. Consider the reimbursement practices prior to the amendment that
authorized payment to parents of children attending parochial
schools. 87 Nowhere did the Court suggest that Ewing Township
was discriminating against religious individuals because of their
faith when only providing reimbursement for parents sending their
children to public schools. Indeed, the Court expressly disavowed
that it was offering such a view: “We do not mean to intimate that
a state could not provide transportation only to children attending
public schools . . . .” 88
At least one reason that such a view might be disavowed is that
people with a variety of religious views might send their children
to parochial school if, for example, the parents believed that the
children would thereby receive a better education than they would

83. See id. at 8 (“The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, . . . commands that a state ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”(quoting Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 108 (1943))).
84. Id. at 16.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 5.
88. Id. at 16; see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he State . . . could respect both its unusually sensitive concern for the conscience of its
taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause. It could make the scholarships redeemable
only at public universities . . . .”); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973) (“This does
not mean, as we have already suggested, that a State is constitutionally obligated to provide
even ‘neutral’ services to sectarian schools.”).
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receive from public school. 89 Parents who sent their children to parochial schools would not be denied reimbursement because of their
faith (or lack thereof), but merely because the children had been
sent to a non-public school.
The issue before the Everson Court was not whether Ewing
Township was permitted to reimburse only those parents whose
children attended public schools. Rather, the issue was whether
Ewing Township was permitted to reimburse not only those parents whose children attended public school, but also those parents
whose children attended parochial school. 90
When holding that such reimbursements did not offend constitutional guarantees, 91 the Court admitted that such a policy might
enable some students to attend parochial school who would not otherwise be able to do so. 92 But, the Court reasoned, the same point
might be made about the provision of a variety of public services—
”parents might be reluctant to permit their children to attend
schools which the state had cut off from such general government
services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks.” 93 But “cutting off
church schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably
marked off from the religious function, . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.” 94 Because the Court interpreted the
New Jersey program as doing “no more than provid[ing] a general
program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools,” the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the spending. 95
It might seem surprising that reimbursement would be viewed
as a safety measure. 96 The Court implied that reimbursement of
89. Cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 704 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“Evidence shows, however, that almost two out of three families using vouchers to send
their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those schools.”).
90. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
91. Id. at 17 (“[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from
spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.”).
92. Id. (“There is even a possibility that some of the children might not be sent to the
church schools if the parents were compelled to pay their children’s bus fares out of their
own pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid for by the State.”).
93. Id. at 17–18.
94. Id. at 18.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“This expenditure of tax funds has no possible
effect on the child’s safety or expedition in transit.”).
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the monies might mean that children would “ride in public busses
to and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other
hazards incident to walking or ‘hitchhiking.’” 97 Of course, children
might still hitchhike, which would allow the family to use the reimbursement for other costs, 98 e.g., defraying tuition expenses, but
the Court did not address that possibility.
The Everson Court also did not discuss the implications of its
comparison of school travel reimbursement to the provision of fire
and police services. If, indeed, the provision of travel reimbursement was permitted, but not required, then one would assume that
the provision of police and fire services to religious institutions was
permitted, but not required. But Ewing Township would not have
been permitted to deny police and fire services to religious institutions, 99 which suggests one of the ways in which the analogy between travel reimbursement and the provision of police and fire
services was inapt. Regrettably, the Court did not offer an account
distinguishing between those services that could not be denied to
religious institutions and those services that states were permitted, but not required, to deny to religious institutions. 100
In his dissent, Justice Jackson explored the travel and police
analogy. He noted:
A policeman protects a Catholic, of course—but not because he is a
Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our society. The
fireman protects the Church school—but not because it is a Church
school; it is because it is property, part of the assets of our society. 101

However, Justice Jackson argued that the statute at issue
authorized reimbursement of “parents for the fares paid, provided
the children attend either public schools or Catholic Church

97. Id. at 7 (majority opinion) (citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884)).
98. Mark Strasser, Repudiating Everson: On Buses, Books, and Teaching Articles of
Faith, 78 MISS. L.J. 567, 577 (2009) (“[I]t may be that those students (if any) who were
hitchhiking or walking to school would still do so and the monies paid in ‘reimbursement’
would be used to defray other costs.”).
99. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom,
74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 586 (1996) (book review) (“[T]o deny any of these forms of support to
religious projects and enterprises [e.g. police and fire services for religious institutions]
would be intolerably antireligious.”).
100. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text (discussing this point in the context
of Comer).
101. Everson, 330 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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schools,” 102 implying that parents would not be reimbursed if their
students had been attending a non-profit Protestant school.
[B]efore these school authorities draw a check to reimburse for a student’s fare they must ask just that question, and if the school is a
Catholic one they may render aid because it is such, while if it is of
any other faith or is run for profit, the help must be withheld. 103

Basically, Justice Jackson was offering a literal interpretation of
the minutes of the meeting in which the additional reimbursement
was authorized. Those minutes read: “The transportation committee recommended the transportation of pupils of Ewing to the
Trenton and Pennington High Schools and Catholic Schools by
way of public carrier as in recent years. On Motion of Mr. Ralph
Ryan and Mr. M. French the same was adopted.” 104
It may well be that this amendment only included Catholic
schools because there were no other kinds of private, non-profit 105
schools to which students may have gone. 106 Had there been nonprofit schools affiliated with other faith traditions, then Establishment Clause guarantees would have been implicated if the town
had reimbursed the transportation costs of children attending
Catholic but not other religious schools. 107
To some extent, Everson is a dispute about statutory interpretation. 108 On its face, the challenged resolution picked out Catholic
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 62 n.59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
105. The Court noted that there had been no challenge to the statute for failing to provide
reimbursement to students attending for-profit schools. See id. at 4 n.2 (majority opinion)
(“Appellant does not challenge the New Jersey statute or the resolution on the ground that
either violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding payment for the transportation of any pupil who attends a ‘private school run for profit.’”).
106. See id. (“Although the township resolution authorized reimbursement only for parents of public and Catholic school pupils, appellant does not allege, nor is there anything in
the record which would offer the slightest support to an allegation, that there were any
children in the township who attended or would have attended, but for want of transportation, any but public and Catholic schools.”).
107. Cf. id. at 25–26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Could we sustain an Act that said police
shall protect pupils on the way to or from public schools and Catholic schools but not while
going to and coming from other schools, and firemen shall extinguish a blaze in public or
Catholic school buildings but shall not put out a blaze in Protestant Church schools or private schools operated for profit? That is the true analogy to the case we have before us and
I should think it pretty plain that such a scheme would not be valid.”); see Strasser, supra
note 98, at 578 (noting that the statute “did not provide reimbursement for students attending non-Catholic religious schools, and thus Everson upheld a statute that facially distinguished among religions”).
108. Cf. Everson, 330 U.S. at 21 (“I think [the taxpayer challenging the constitutionality
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schools for special treatment—parents of children attending any
other type of religious school would not be entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs. 109 But the lower court had interpreted the resolution nonliterally: “The result, of course, is to provide for free transportation of children at the expense of the home
municipality and of the State school fund to and from any school,
other than a public school, which is not operated for profit . . . .” 110
Under that interpretation, a parent whose child attended a nonprofit Protestant school would also have transportation costs reimbursed.
The Court did not specify whether it was simply adopting the
trial court’s interpretation of the resolution, express language notwithstanding, or whether it was reading the resolution that way,
for example, to forestall the next resolution that would have been
worded more carefully so as not to facially benefit one religion over
another. 111 Basically, the Everson Court interpreted the resolution
as authorizing the reimbursement of travel expenses for all children attending public and parochial schools, including Catholic
schools. 112 The Court then upheld the authorization, even while
maintaining the necessity of “erect[ing] a wall between church and
state. That . . . must be kept high and impregnable.” 113 That said,
however, the Court nowhere stated or even implied that the state
would have been acting unconstitutionally had it continued to refuse to reimburse parents whose children attended parochial
schools.
B. Court Members Discuss Blaine Amendments
In Mitchell v. Helms, 114 several members of the Court expressed
their strong disapproval of the Federal Blaine Amendment. At issue was whether the federal government’s financial aid to public
of the reimbursement] is entitled to have us consider the Act just as it is written.”).
109. Id. at 20 (“[T]he Court also insists that we must close our eyes to a discrimination which does exist. The resolution which authorizes disbursement of this taxpayer’s
money limits reimbursement to those who attend public schools and Catholic schools.”).
110. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 39 A.2d 75, 76 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944).
111. Cf. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (“[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits
New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils
as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and
other schools.”).
112. See id. at 4 n.2, 18.
113. Id. at 17–18.
114. 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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and private schools, including religious schools, violated the Establishment Clause. 115 In upholding the constitutionality of the federal funding of parochial and non-parochial schools, 116 the plurality explained that “hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools
has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow.” 117
The Mitchell plurality explained that “[o]pposition to aid to ‘sectarian’ schools acquired prominence in the 1870’s with Congress’s
consideration (and near passage) of the Blaine Amendment.” 118
That amendment was considered “at a time of pervasive hostility
to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an
open secret that ‘sectarian’ was code for ‘Catholic.’” 119 The plurality
concluded that “nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the
exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs [and that] . . . . [t]his doctrine, born of bigotry,
should be buried now.” 120
The plurality’s argument that the exclusion of pervasively sectarian schools from aid programs should end was not particularly
persuasive. Merely because the Federal Blaine Amendment was
proposed at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church
does not establish that State Blaine Amendments, which might
have been adopted before or after the Federal Blaine Amendment
was proposed, were also motivated by anti-Catholic animus. Further, that a particular state amendment was unconstitutional because of an impermissible purpose would not establish that an
identically worded amendment adopted to promote other (permissible) purposes would also be constitutionally infirm. Basically, the
Mitchell plurality implied that because some State Blaine Amendments might have had an impermissible purpose, all such bans are
unconstitutional.
The Mitchell plurality implied that opposition to funding pervasively sectarian schools was born of bigotry. 121 But Everson’s high

115. Id. at 801.
116. See id. at 835 (“[W]e hold that Chapter 2 is not a law respecting an establishment
of religion.”).
117. Id. at 828.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 38 (1992)).
120. Id. at 829.
121. See id. at 912 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The plurality . . . equates a refusal to aid
religious schools with hostility to religion . . . .”).
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wall precluded “contribut[ing] tax-raised funds to the support of an
institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church,” 122
which means that tax-raised funds cannot be used to support pervasively sectarian schools teaching religious doctrine throughout
the curriculum. 123 One might have expected the Mitchell plurality
to have condemned Everson for having espoused a position that
was allegedly born of bigotry; instead, the plurality approvingly
cited Everson as part of the Establishment Clause canon. 124 Apparent approval of the decision notwithstanding, the Mitchell plurality gave short shrift to Everson’s limitation on the use of tax-raised
funds to support religion, instead offering a very narrow interpretation of what the Establishment Clause prohibits. 125
The Mitchell plurality claimed that the Establishment Clause
only precluded “aid itself [that] has an impermissible content,” 126
suggesting that something fungible like money is permissibly
given to pervasively sectarian schools regardless of how those
funds are spent, 127 for example, even to buy Bibles. 128 But such a
policy is simply incompatible with Everson’s prohibition on using
state funds to help teach religious doctrine. 129

122. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
123. Cf. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976) (suggesting that in pervasively sectarian schools, “secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian ones”);
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 885–86 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he overriding religious mission of
certain schools, those sometimes called ’pervasively sectarian,’ . . . permeates their teaching.”(citations omitted)).
124. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807 (plurality opinion).
125. See id. at 808 (“Chapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement. . . . [I]t neither
results in religious indoctrination by the government nor defines its recipients by reference
to religion. We therefore hold that Chapter 2 is not a ‘law respecting an establishment of
religion.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I)).
126. Id. at 822.
127. Id.; Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1,
40 (2006) (“Mitchell fine-tunes this analysis by making it clear that so long as a program
satisfies the formal neutrality requirement, the Constitution is not violated if the religious
organization receiving the government funds converts those funds to specifically religious
purposes . . . .”).
128. Gey, supra note 127, at 40 (“In other words, the government cannot give a religious
school Bibles, but it may give the religious school money that the school can use to buy Bibles.”).
129. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 877, 901,
911 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no mistaking the abandonment of doctrine that
would occur if the plurality were to become a majority.”); see also Ira C. Lupu, Government
Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 807–08 (2001) (“[The Court’s] decision . . .
in Mitchell v. Helms . . . broke new ground in a number of ways, and upheld an aid program
that never would have survived at the time of either Everson or Lemon.”).
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Gaps in its reasoning notwithstanding, the Mitchell plurality’s
attitude toward bans on funding sectarian schools is clear. Yet, the
Court manifested a much different attitude in Locke v. Davey. 130
At issue was Washington State’s “Promise Scholarship Program . . . [which] assist[ed] academically gifted students with postsecondary education expenses.” 131 The Washington Constitution
had been interpreted to preclude funding for those who wished to
pursue a degree in devotional theology. 132 Joshua Davey, a scholarship recipient, wanted to “pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration.” 133 But, he could
only receive the scholarship if he were willing to certify that he
would not use the money to pursue a degree in devotional theology. 134 He was unwilling to so certify and was not awarded the
scholarship. 135 Davey then challenged the denial of the scholarship
as a violation of the guarantees of the Establishment, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses. 136
The Locke Court suggested that Washington could have chosen
to fund devotional theology studies without violating federal constitutional guarantees. 137 But a separate issue was whether Washington’s choice not to fund devotional theology studies was either
born of animus or forbidden by the Federal Constitution. 138 The
Locke Court could “find neither in the history or text of Article I, §
11, of the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the
Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggest[ed] animus
toward religion.” 139 Not only was there no animus, but the Court

130. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
131. Id. at 715.
132. Id. (“In accordance with the State Constitution, students may not use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional theology.”).
133. Id. at 717.
134. Id. (“[T]o receive the funds appropriated for his use, he must certify in writing that
he was not pursuing such a [devotional theology] degree . . . .”).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 718 (“He argued the denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue
a theology degree violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech
Clauses of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
137. Id. at 719 (“[T]here is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology . . . .”).
138. Id. at 719–21, 725.
139. Id. at 725.
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could “think of few areas in which a State’s anti-establishment interests come more into play,” 140 which suggested that state constitutional bans on support of sectarian institutions may serve legitimate and important state interests. 141
The Locke Court understood that its holding permitted states to
distinguish between secular and religious professions, providing
funding for the one and not the other, even though that meant that
religious professions were being picked out for unfavorable treatment. 142 But the Court believed that states have a reason to treat
religion differently—“the subject of religion is one in which both
the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views—
in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment—that find
no counterpart with respect to other callings or professions.” 143
The difference in tone in the Locke majority and Mitchell plurality opinions is unmistakable. 144 The former suggests that the refusal to fund religious education may be for legitimate reasons,
while the latter suggests that such refusals reflect animus. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 145 the Court made
its position on state refusals to fund religious institutions even
more confusing.
C. Comer Further Muddies the Waters
At issue in Comer was the constitutionality of a decision by the
Missouri Department of Natural Resources to deny a grant to the
Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center (“Center”) to help
resurface its playground because of the School’s affiliation with the

140. Id. at 722.
141. See id. at 725; Goldenziel, supra note 5, at 58 (“[T]he Supreme Court implicitly approved the use of state constitutional amendments to provide stronger protection from religious establishment than that guaranteed by the federal constitution.” (citing Locke, 540
U.S. at 715)).
142. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721 (“Because the Promise Scholarship Program funds training
for all secular professions, Justice Scalia contends the State must also fund training for
religious professions.”).
143. Id.
144. Ironically, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined the Mitchell plurality opinion. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Locke opinion with Justice Kennedy joining in it. Locke, 540 U.S. at
713.
145. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
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Trinity Lutheran Church (“Church”). 146 Had it not been affiliated
with a church, it almost certainly would have received a grant. 147
The Church challenged the denial as a violation of free exercise
guarantees. 148 Both the federal district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals sided with the Department of Natural Resources, citing Locke. 149 The Comer Court disagreed. 150
The Court began its analysis by noting that all parties agreed
that the Establishment Clause “does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program.” 151 Therefore,
that was not at issue, and the Court set out to analyze whether the
Department’s grant denial was constitutionally permissible under
the Free Exercise Clause, given the “‘play in the joints’ between
what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise
Clause compels.” 152
The Comer Court noted that the Everson Court had upheld the
reimbursement of travel expenses to parents sending their children to parochial schools, and then echoed Everson by explaining
that a State “cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their
own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.” 153

Regrettably, the Court did not explain why it had included that
quotation from Everson nor why it had retained emphasis on those
particular words, although one might reasonably infer that the
146. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017–18 (“[T]he Center was deemed categorically ineligible
to receive a grant. . . . [T]he program director explained that, under Article I, Section 7 of
the Missouri Constitution, the Department could not provide financial assistance directly
to a church.”).
147. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2018 (“The Center ranked fifth among the 44 applicants
in the 2012 Scrap Tire Program. . . . The Department ultimately awarded 14 grants as part
of the 2012 program.”); see also id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.
148. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2018 (“The Church alleged that the Department’s failure to
approve the Center’s application, pursuant to its policy of denying grants to religiously affiliated applicants, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”).
149. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2018–19; Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir. 2015); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Pauley, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (W.D. Mo. 2013).
150. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
151. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
152. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004)).
153. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–20 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16
(1947)).
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Court cited that passage because it believed that Missouri was
somehow violating the letter or spirit of Everson.
Yet, Missouri did not appear to be denying individual Catholics,
Protestants, Jews, Muslims, et cetera, the benefits of public legislation because of their faith or lack thereof. People of a variety of
faiths sent their children to the Center, and the Center had not
been denied the funds because of the parents’ religious beliefs or
lack thereof. 154 So, too, in Everson, before the reimbursement authorization had been modified, 155 individual parents sending their
children to parochial schools had not been denied travel reimbursement because of their beliefs but, because the Center to which they
were sending their children was parochial rather than public. 156
Everson held that the Establishment Clause does not bar affording any and all public benefits to sectarian institutions 157 and that
affording the particular benefit at issue was not barred by Establishment Clause guarantees. 158 But Everson’s focus was not on
whether New Jersey was permitted to refuse funding transportation costs of those attending parochial schools, and to the extent
that issue was addressed, the Court suggested that such a refusal
did not offend constitutional guarantees. 159 Further, when upholding the reimbursement of the parents of children attending parochial schools for transportation costs, 160 the Court emphasized that

154. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017 (“The Center admits students of any religion, and
enrollment stands at about 90 children ranging from age two to five.”).
155. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 39 A.2d 75, 75 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1944) (citing 1903 N.J. Laws
45–46 and 1941 N.J. Laws 581).
156. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 3; cf. Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State Bd. of Educ.,
332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Brusca v. State Bd. of Educ., 405 U.S.
1050 (1972) (“All children of every or no religious denomination have the same right to attend free secular public schools maintained with tax funds.”).
157. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18 (“[C]ut[ing] off [religious institutions] from such general
government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal,
public highways and sidewalks. . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.”).
158. Id. at 18 (“The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That
wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New
Jersey has not breached it here.”).
159. Id. at 5, 17–18.
160. Id. at 5, 16, 18 (“[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey
against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New
Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief.”); see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. __,
__, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2017) (discussing Everson’s “ruling that the Establishment Clause
allowed New Jersey to extend that public benefit to all its citizens regardless of their religious belief”).
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no money was going to sectarian schools. 161 But these aspects of
Everson were ignored by the Comer Court.
There are at least three constitutionally significant respects in
which the issues addressed by the Comer Court differed from those
addressed by the Everson Court:
(1) Comer addressed whether state funds can be given to a sectarian institution rather than to a parent, and the Everson Court
emphasized that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion.” 162
(2) Even if Everson were somehow read to permit funding sectarian institutions, Comer addressed whether Missouri was precluded from refusing to do so. 163 The Everson Court was unwilling
to say that New Jersey had to reimburse parents for their children’s transportation costs to parochial school 164 and so would
hardly have held that Missouri was required to fund sectarian institutions. Yet, the Comer Court used Everson for support. 165
(3) When the Everson Court said that New Jersey “cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of
any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation,” the Court was discussing
individual “citizens,” 166 such as the parents of children attending
parochial schools. However, the Comer Court’s focus was not on the
beliefs of the individual parents sending their children to the Center, but on the beliefs of the Center itself. 167 Because those beliefs

161. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (“The State contributes no money to the schools. It does not
support them.”); see Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“The government may not directly fund religious exercise.” (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 16)).
162. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16; see Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017 (discussing
Missouri’s policy of categorically denying grants to churches and religious organizations).
163. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 5 (discussing parents’ ability to access state funds to
reimburse bus transportation costs to a parochial school), with Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137
S. Ct. at 2017 (determining whether Missouri violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying
grants to religious organizations).
164. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“[W]e do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide
transportation only to children attending public schools . . . .”).
165. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–20 (suggesting that Everson supported
the Comer result).
166. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
167. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2021–22 (“The Department’s policy expressly
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were religious, the Court implied that the Center was being treated
unfairly. 168 But this is a significant change in focus. If Everson’s
warning that individuals should not be denied public benefits because of their beliefs was meant to include individual religious institutions, then it would be unlikely for the Court to have suggested that it was permissible for New Jersey to deny reimbursement of transportation costs to religious schools. Indeed, Everson
suggested that the Establishment Clause prevents the state from
giving funds to individual religious institutions precisely because
of their character, which of course picks out religious institutions
and disfavors them, at least with respect to their receiving state
funding.
Suppose that Ewing Township had initially reserved reimbursement for parents of children attending public schools precisely because the only nonprofit schools that were not public were religious, and the New Jersey Constitution precluded giving public
funds to religious schools. Comer implied that reserving funds for
public schools for that reason would have violated constitutional
guarantees, 169 whereas the Everson Court suggested that reimbursement of travel funds to private schools was permissible, but
not required. 170
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources did not refuse to
award the grant to the Center out of animus, but because of a provision in the Missouri Constitution providing:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly
or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or
in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and
that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made
against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious
faith or worship. 171

One question is whether that constitutional provision actually
prevents such grants from being awarded to religious preschools.
discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.”).
168. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019 (“The Free Exercise Clause ‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target
the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status.’” (quoting Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542 (1993) (alteration in
original))).
169. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2020.
170. Everson, 330 U.S. at 4–5.
171. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7).
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Perhaps that provision is best interpreted as not barring religious
schools from receiving certain public benefits, 172 although that
would be a question best left to the Missouri Supreme Court. 173
However, rather than wait for a clarification of state law, 174 the
Comer Court instead addressed whether the state was constitutionally permitted to deny the benefit at issue. 175
The Comer Court held that states are prohibited from discriminating against religious entities, in particular, with respect to the
distribution of certain public benefits. 176 This holding is not
surprising, depending upon which public benefits are included
within that limitation. Few people, if any, would suggest that
states are ermitted to deny police and fire services to religious institutions. 177 The difficulty posed by Comer is in figuring out which

172. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3 (“This case involves express discrimination based
on religious identity with respect to playground resurfacing.”); cf. id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at
2021 (“The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.”).
The Missouri Supreme Court has construed this provision in different cases. Compare Ams.
United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1976) (upholding the constitutionality of tuition
grants even if used to attend religious institutions as long as certain conditions were met),
with Paster v. Ussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974) (holding a statute unconstitutional insofar
as it permitted textbooks to be loaned free of charge to students attending religious schools).
173. See, e.g., Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. County of King, 264 U.S. 22, 27 (1924)
(“The objections based on the state constitution of Washington have been settled adversely
and conclusively for us by the decision herein of the State Supreme Court.”); see also Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000) (“[S]tate supreme courts have the unquestioned, final
authority to interpret their state constitutions.”); Eric M. Hartmann, Preservation, Primacy,
and Process: A More Consistent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation in Iowa, 102
IOWA L. REV. 2265, 2285 (2017) (“[S]tate supreme courts are the final arbiters of their respective state constitutions.”).
174. See Verity Winship, Cooperative Interbranch Federalism: Certification of State-Law
Questions by Federal Agencies, 63 VAND. L. REV. 181, 182 (2010) (“When an unresolved
state-law question arises in federal court, the court may ‘certify’ it to the relevant state
court.”).
175. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019. There is some basis for believing that the
Missouri Supreme Court would have upheld the department’s interpretation of its state
constitutional obligation. See Harfst v. Hoegen, 163 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Mo. 1941) (“The constitutional policy of our State has decreed the absolute separation of church and state, not
only in governmental matters, but in educational ones as well.”).
176. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2021, 2024–25; id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–
27 (Breyer, J., concurring) (likening the denial of the grant to promote health and safety in
the instant case to the denial of police and fire services that Everson suggested would be
impermissible (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947)).
177. See Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, “Equal Concern and
Respect,” and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989,
998 (1993) (“Few persons, though, are so relentlessly anti-clerical as to deny police and fire
protection to a church.”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious
Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 49 (2002) (“Secularists believe
that religious entities must survive entirely on private support, excepting only those public
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public benefits must be accorded to sectarian institutions 178 and
why.
The Comer Court implied that the implicated constitutional difficulty was that the policy at issue “single[d] out the religious for
disfavored treatment.” 179 The Court acknowledged that the Missouri policy triggered “the most exacting scrutiny.” 180 However, the
Court did not make clear whether it triggered strict scrutiny because, as a general matter, such scrutiny is triggered when religious entities are picked out for less favorable treatment, 181 or because it was picking out religious entities for less favorable
treatment with respect to the provision of (a particular kind of)
public benefit. 182
Locke rejected that strict scrutiny was triggered merely because
a religious program was receiving less favorable treatment 183 and,
further, suggested that Washington had “substantial” interests
served in not funding devotion studies. 184 Assuming that Locke is
still good law, 185 the mere fact that a religious group is treated less

goods, such as police and fire protection, available to all as a common right.”).
178. Cf. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973)
(“In Everson, the Court found the bus fare program analogous to the provision of services
such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, highways, and sidewalks for parochial
schools.” (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18)).
179. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2020.
180. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2021 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
181. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“And the general
principles here do not permit discrimination against religious exercise—whether on the
playground or anywhere else.”); cf. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious
practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of
scrutiny.”).
182. Compare Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“But
I find relevant, and would emphasize, the particular nature of the ‘public benefit’ here at
issue.”), with id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“I worry that
some might mistakenly read it to suggest that only ‘playground resurfacing’ cases, or only
those with some association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps some other social
good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by the legal rules recounted in and faithfully
applied by the Court’s opinion.”).
183. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (“Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey’s claim must fail.”); see also Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2025
(Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“Locke did not subject the law at issue to any form of
heightened scrutiny.”).
184. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725.
185. But see Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part)
(“This Court’s endorsement in Locke of even a ‘mil[d] kind’ of discrimination against religion
remains troubling.” (alteration in original) (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 720)).

STRASSER AC 524 (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

FREE EXERCISE AND COMER

4/6/2018 9:56 AM

917

favorably neither establishes animus, 186 nor even that the practice
at issue is presumptively invalid. 187
Like Washington, Missouri had important anti-establishment
interests implicated, 188 and at least one of the questions at hand
was why strict scrutiny was employed in Comer, but not in Locke.
In one interpretation, it was because a kind of public benefit analogous to police and fire services was being withheld from a religious entity. 189 In another interpretation, it was merely because
the state benefit withheld in Comer was for something other than
the pursuit of devotional studies. 190
Comer is regrettable, at least in part, because its analysis obscures rather than clarifies free exercise guarantees in particular,
and the Religion Clauses more generally. The Court offered language suggesting that religious entities should not be treated differently than others, but did not strike down Missouri’s State
Blaine Amendment requiring that differentiation, nor cast doubt
upon the legitimacy of state anti-establishment interests. 191 Members of the Court hinted that the nature of the benefits might be
important in its analysis, but seemed not to consider, much less
spell out, the ramifications of the differing positions. 192
Presumably, all members of the Court agree that a state could
not deny police and fire services to a religious institution. 193 But
that is because fire and police services should be provided to all.
When Justice Jackson discussed the police and travel expense
186. Locke, 540 U.S. at 725 (“[W]e find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of
the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.”).
187. Id. (noting that no “presumption of unconstitutionality” was at issue).
188. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2032 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Missouri has
decided that the unique status of houses of worship requires a special rule when it comes to
public funds. . . . Missouri’s decision, which has deep roots in our Nation’s history, reflects
a reasonable and constitutional judgment.”); Locke, 540 U.S. at 722.
189. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2026–27 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947)).
190. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (“But
[the Locke Court] also did not suggest that discrimination against religion outside the limited context of support for ministerial training would be similarly exempt from exacting
review.”).
191. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25 (majority opinion).
192. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
193. Cf. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court
stated in Everson that ‘cutting off church schools from’ such ‘general government services
as ordinary police and fire protection . . . is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18)).
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analogy in his Everson dissent, 194 he was suggesting that members
of society as a general matter should be afforded those services. 195
But, as Justice Breyer recognized in his Comer concurrence, the
benefit at issue in Comer was only awarded to a limited number of
recipients. 196 While he rightly noted that the fact that this was a
limited benefit did not itself justify precluding religious entities
from receiving the benefits, 197 he seemed to ignore why the State
was not awarding that benefit to religious schools.
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources did not deny the
grant because of administrative convenience or out of whim or animus, 198 but because of Missouri’s State Blaine Amendment. 199 If
the State’s anti-establishment interests are legitimate or important, then there is a basis for distinguishing between religious
and other schools, assuming that the constitutional amendment
does indeed require that deserving religious schools not be
awarded this benefit. 200 It was not merely the fact that the Center
was religious that justified the differential treatment. Rather, it
was because, in addition, Missouri’s State Blaine Amendment precluded the Church from receiving this grant 201 and because that
amendment (presumably) serves valid and legitimate state interests. 202
Justice Breyer’s observation that the benefit at issue could only
be awarded to a limited number of people is important for an additional reason. One of the reasons that the police and fire analogy
is so powerful is that this is the kind of benefit that all should receive. But one of the lessons of Everson is that a state is permitted,

194. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
195. Everson, 330 U.S. at 25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A policeman protects a Catholic,
of course—but not because he is a Catholic; it is because he is a man and a member of our
society. The fireman protects the Church school—but not because it is a Church school; it is
because it is property, part of the assets of our society.”).
196. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he program
at issue ultimately funds only a limited number of projects . . . .”).
197. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (“The fact that the program at issue ultimately funds
only a limited number of projects cannot itself justify a religious distinction.”).
198. Cf. id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (“Nor is there any administrative or other reason to
treat church schools differently.”).
199. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017 (majority opinion) (“That policy, in the Department’s
view, was compelled by Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution . . . .”).
200. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
201. But see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 140–43 and accompanying text (discussing the Locke Court’s description of Washington’s legitimate anti-establishment interests).
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but not required, to accord some health and safety benefits to religious institutions. If the benefit at issue in Comer is like the benefit
at issue in Everson in that respect, then it would be the kind of
benefit that the Establishment Clause would permit, but the Free
Exercise Clause would not require awarding. Basically, by implying that Everson supports the Comer holding, 203 Comer rewrites
Everson to suggest that according the benefit was not only permissible, but required.
The Court may have been rewriting Everson in another respect,
namely, to suggest that the Everson Court’s cautioning that individual citizens should not be denied public benefits because of their
faith 204 has now been expanded to include individual religious institutions. 205 But such a reading would require a reworking of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Everson interprets the guarantees of the Establishment Clause as precluding state funding of
sectarian institutions, which picks out sectarian institutions for
less favorable treatment and, hence, would violate Comer’s prohibition of targeting such institutions.
In his Locke dissent, Justice Scalia recognized that the Constitution would have permitted Washington to restrict the scholarship to public universities. 206 Presumably, Missouri might have
limited its tire program to public entities, for example, city parks
and public schools who could have used rubberized surfaces to
make their playgrounds safer. According to Justice Scalia, were
Missouri to have done that, the State would not have been subjecting religious institutions to facial discrimination. 207 But one of the
questions before the Court in Comer was whether Missouri could
offer rubberized surface grants to deserving, secular, private institutions. 208
Comer may be interpreted to impose new restraints on those
states with constitutional amendments banning support of sec-

203. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019–20.
204. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
205. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (stating that “the exclusion of Trinity
Lutheran from a public benefit . . . solely because it is a church . . . cannot stand”).
206. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 729 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The state] could
make the scholarships redeemable only at public universities . . . .”).
207. Id. (noting that limiting the scholarships to public universities “would replace a
program that facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens not to subsidize it”).
208. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
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tarian institutions. Consider university scholarships: Comer, combined with a State Blaine Amendment, may prevent a state from
affording scholarships to students at private, secular universities.
Comer suggests that the Federal Constitution precludes the
state from picking out religious schools, in particular, for adverse
treatment. 209 Missouri’s State Blaine Amendment precludes the
state from giving state funds to religious institutions. 210 That State
Blaine Amendment has not been struck down and, depending upon
how it is interpreted, 211 may preclude the state from affording
scholarships to religious institutions. 212 But combining the state
and federal constitutional limitations would seem to require that
the state only provide scholarships to public institutions. Further,
if indeed the Court takes seriously that individual religious institutions cannot be treated less favorably because of their faith, then
there may be other kinds of benefits that states will be precluded
from offering to non-religious, private entities without also awarding them to religious, private entities. Basically, if the state constitutional limitation on giving state aid to religious institutions is
interpreted broadly, and if Comer is interpreted to preclude picking
out religious institutions for less favorable treatment with respect
to almost all public benefits rather than to only a limited number
of public benefits, then states with such constitutional provisions
may be severely limited with respect to the kinds of benefits that
they can accord to private, secular institutions.
CONCLUSION
In Comer, the Court struck down Missouri’s refusal to provide a
grant to otherwise deserving sectarian institutions on free exercise
grounds. 213 But the Court failed to offer a coherent rationale for its
holding and made the existing jurisprudence even more muddled
than it was before.

209. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2019.
210. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 172–75, 191 and accompanying text.
212. Cf. Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 275, 279 (E.D.
Mo. 1971) (“We find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in the determination of the State to
deny its funds to sectarian schools or for religious instruction.”).
213. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2017, 2019, 2021–22.
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Various states have State Blaine Amendments. 214 The Court did
not say that such amendments were motivated by animus or even
that they were unconstitutional. But, as the Locke Court explained,
such amendments pick out sectarian institutions for disfavored
treatment out of legitimate anti-establishment interests. 215 Without casting doubt on Locke’s assessment of the implicated anti-establishment interests as legitimate and important, the Comer
Court struck down Missouri’s actions based on state law because
doing so allegedly violated the guarantees of the Free Exercise
Clause. 216
Comer would have been more understandable if Missouri had
been denying a public benefit to a sectarian institution, like police
or fire services, that all should receive. But the benefit at issue
could only be accorded to some, and Missouri’s decision to promote
legitimate anti-establishment interests rather than, for example,
choose the recipients randomly, would seem to have been entitled
to some deference.
Comer would also have been easier to understand if the lower
courts had thought Missouri was barred from awarding that benefit by federal Establishment Clause guarantees because the Comer
Court might then have reasonably suggested that Everson was controlling. But the question was whether Missouri was required, rather than merely permitted, to award the benefit. Comer is difficult
to understand, at least in part, because the Court suggests that
Everson governs the analysis without seeming to appreciate the
constitutionally significant differences between the two cases or
even how Comer undercuts the Everson Court’s reasoning.
Certainly, the opinions can be reconciled—Everson suggested
that certain public benefits cannot be denied to religious institutions, 217 and it might be argued that the provision of a grant to
acquire a rubberized surface for a playground is more like police
and fire services 218 than the reimbursement of travel costs to parochial schools. If that is so, however, then one must wonder what
justification could be offered for denying such a good to anyone.

214. See Jonathan D. Boyer, Education Tax Credits: School Choice Initiatives Capable of
Surmounting Blaine Amendments, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 117, 131 (2009).
215. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721–22 (2004).
216. Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2022–24.
217. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1946).
218. See Comer, 582 U.S. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Certainly, it would not be permissible to award police and fire services to only some deserving recipients, regardless of how the deserving are defined.
Comer did too much and too little. It suggested that religious
entities cannot be disfavored without specifying the implications of
such a position for Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 219 If the
Court merely meant that religious institutions cannot be disfavored with respect to their eligibility for the provision of certain
benefits, then the Court should have done more to explain which
benefits could not be denied and why.
The Court did not address whether states have legitimate or important anti-establishment interests nor how such interests should
be weighed in the balance if Locke’s recognition of such interests
remains good law. Overall, the Court made Religion Clause jurisprudence even murkier without any apparent awareness of which
doctrines were being undermined.
Comer can, and likely will, be read in a host of different ways by
the lower courts, which will make Religion Clause guarantees even
more uncertain and variable across the circuits. At its earliest opportunity, the Court must provide clarification, if only to make
clear whether the Court is substantially reworking the Religion
Clauses 220 or, instead, is only adding a benefit to the list of those
that cannot be denied to a religious institution because of its beliefs. 221

219. Id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2024.
220. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This case is about
nothing less than the relationship between religious institutions and the civil government—
that is, between church and state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by
holding, for the first time, that the Constitution requires the government to provide public
funds directly to a church.”).
221. See id. at __, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (“To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about
recycling tires to resurface a playground.”).

